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Interpretative Discretion of Judiciary  
and the Well-Being of the Child
Interpretacyjna dyskrecjonalność sędziowska a dobro dziecka
SUMMARY
The well-being of the child is a common criterion in many Polish normative regulations pertaining 
to different branches of law. It is both a tool for the law-making and the executive bodies, employed 
to direct the law-applying bodies towards ensuring full protection of the child. This article is focused 
on analysing interpretative judicial discretion with respect to the well-being of the child as manifested 
in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court and in the judgements of the Supreme Administrative 
Court and Constitutional Tribunal. In the course of the research, the author undertakes to determine the 
essence of interpretative judicial discretion in cases predominantly focused on establishing the current 
and postulated situation of the child with a view to ensuring the most favourable ruling for the same.
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INTRODUCTION
“The well-being of the child”1 is an inter-branch construct in the legal system. 
It is also an interdisciplinary value, rooted as it is in sociology, psychology, phi-
losophy, etc. The criterion of said well-being constitutes a tool applicable to both 
* The paper has been prepared as a part of the research grant, entitled “The normative construct 
‘the good of the child’ and its judicial application” (UMO-2017/25/N/HS5/01692), financed by 
Narodowe Centrum Nauki (National Science Center, Poland).
1 In the paper, I refer to the construct of “the well-being of the child” functioning within the 
framework of the 1989 United Nations Convention on Rights of the Child as the most adequate 
counterpart of the Polish expression (“the good of the child”). Given the certain terminological 





law-makers, who direct their interpretative inference towards ensuring the full 
personal protection of the child, and the law-applying bodies alike. The criterion 
may be included as an element of legal principles or general reference clauses. It 
should be mentioned that the framework of the legal system includes normative 
acts wherein: a) the normative construct of “the well-being of the child” is an 
apparent element of the legal provision; b) the well-being of the child is not in-
cluded in the wording of the normative construct but the linguistic context of the 
normative act indicates consideration of specific extra-legal values2 that need to 
be taken into account in the evaluation of the child’s situation; c) there are other 
constructs whose semantic scope is, to an extent, similar to that of “the well-being 
of the child”, e.g. “the well-being of the student”, “the well-being of the minor”. As 
such, the well-being of the child is not defined in normative acts, which means that 
the burden of determining its meaning lies, each time, with the entity applying the 
law. At the same time, judicial authorities look for definitions already formulated 
by legal science experts3.
The main focus of this paper is on the issue of interpretative discretion of judges4 
considered with reference to an analysis of the Supreme Court, Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, and Constitutional Tribunal case law in the context of the well-being 
of the child. With regard to the concept of discretionary powers, one could cite 
the definition proposed by J. Stelmach who refers to the dictionary explanation to 
indicate that judicial discretion ought to be understood as “(the judge’s) ability to 
assume the legal character of norms (principles) other than previously identified as 
inconsistency and the parallel use in the text of the Convention of the construct “the welfare of the 
child”, I assume that the latter ought to be applied in the context of judicial decisions as a reference 
to the child’s material prosperity. A short explanation is also warranted for my use of the concepts 
of normative construct and criterion. I understand a normative construct, after L. Leszczyński, as 
a construct “which is clearly provided in the text of a legal act (law) and whereby the law-maker 
correlates with norms, addressees the principles of accounting for extra-legal criteria in decisions 
regarding the application of law or »compliance« therewith” (L. Leszczyński, Stosowanie generalnych 
klauzul odsyłających, Kraków 2001, p. 22). A criterion, also referred to in the paper as an extra-legal 
criterion, is a legally undefined category. Cf. ibidem.
2 Judicial authorities often adopt the premise that the well-being of the child constitutes a value. 
See, e.g., judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 26 November 2013, P 33/12, Legalis 740186.
3 Example definitions can be found in: J. Marciniak, Treść i sprawowanie opieki nad małoletnim, 
Warszawa 1975, p. 10; W. Stojanowska, Dobro dziecka w aspekcie sprawowania nad nim władzy 
rodzicielskiej, „Studia nad Rodziną” 2000, nr 4/1(6), p. 55; S. Kołodziejski, Dobro wspólnych małolet-
nich dzieci jako przesłanka odmowy orzeczenia rozwodu, „Palestra” 1965, nr 9, p. 30; T. Żyznowski, 
[in:] Kodeks postępowania cywilnego, t. 2: Komentarz. Art. 367–729, red. A. Marciniak, K. Piasecki, 
Warszawa 2016, p. 824.
4 Some of the most important publications on the subject of judicial discretion include: Dys-
krecjonalność w prawie, red. W. Staśkiewicz, T. Stawecki, Warszawa 2010; B. Wojciechowski, 
Dyskrecjonalność sędziowska. Studium teoretycznoprawne, Toruń 2004; D.J. Galligan, Discretionary 
Powers. A Legal Study of Official Discretion, New York 2011.
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legal”. The author analyzes the concept of judicial discretion based on the positivist 
and non-positivist concepts of law5. In turn, A. Kozak analyzes discretionary powers 
from the external (“political”) and internal (“legal”) perspective, the latter of which 
is directly related to judicial ruling and pertains to the approach adopted by the 
authority competent to interpret legal texts and issue decisions6. B. Wojciechowski 
argues that a narrow or broad perspective can be adopted when discussing judicial 
discretion. The narrow approach pertains to the freedom of choosing alternatively 
formulated legal consequences whereas the broad approach entails a certain thought 
process, assessment of facts, interpretation of legal norms, determination of mutual 
correlations between the same, and at times also actual law-making7.
The aim of this article is to discuss the impact of the child’s well-being on 
judicial discretion and the ways in which said discretion can be exercised. It is 
noteworthy that courts can take advantage of a relatively broad spectrum thereof 
when adopting the aforementioned criterion. Said scope is determined by law-givers 
and stems from the character of the criterion itself, which may be associated with 
the question of legal vs extra-legal axiology.
THE CRITERION OF THE WELL-BEING OF THE CHILD 
AS AN ELEMENT OF A GENERAL REFERENCE CLAUSE
The well-being of the child may be treated as a directive, assumption, goal, value, 
premise, or exception8. The way in which said well-being is classified strongly sug-
gests the existence of interpretative judicial discretion9. Moreover, the character of this 
criterion is somewhat peculiar as it adapts itself to its normative environment due to 
such properties of the expression as its indefiniteness. The wording is also distinctly 
abstract, which determines “the qualification of a given phenomenon or state as cor-
5 J. Stelmach, Dyskrecjonalność sędziowska w pozytywistycznych i niepozytywistycznych kon-
cepcjach prawa, [in:] Dyskrecjonalność w prawie…, p. 54.
6 A. Kozak, Dylematy prawniczej dyskrecjonalności. Między ideologią polityki a teorią prawa, 
[in:] Dyskrecjonalność w prawie…, p. 59 ff.
7 B. Wojciechowski, op. cit., pp. 16–17 and 66.
8 The meanings of each of those terms are demonstrably different. See Słownik języka polskie-
go, t. 1: A–K, red. M. Szymczak, Warszawa 1978, p. 235, 487; Słownik języka polskiego, t. 2: L–P, 
red. M. Szymczak, Warszawa 1979, p. 1006; Słownik języka polskiego, t. 3: R–Ż, red. M. Szymczak, 
Warszawa 1981, p. 660, 924.
9 With regard to the criterion of the well-being of the child, or more specifically the principle of 
protecting the same, the term “directive” is most often applied. See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme 
Court – Criminal Division of 18 April 2013, SNO 6/13, Legalis 797136; resolution of the Supreme 
Court – Civil Division of 8 March 2006, III CZP 98/05, Legalis 73542; resolution of the Supreme 
Court – Civil Division of 24 February 2011, III CZP 137/10, Legalis 287414.





responding to the wording of the given name”10. Hence, the concept itself is difficult 
to define and requires case-by-case interpretation with due consideration for the facts 
established in the given matter. Some semantic hints may be found in the fact that 
well-being is overall a desirable, positive value which applies personally to the child. 
Therefore, the criterion ought to be construed through the prism of rights, dignity, 
individual safety and social status subject to protection, due to the minor or underage 
person’s susceptibility, lack of life experience, and still developing worldview.
As follows from the conducted analysis, in Polish law, judicial discretion with 
regard to determining the child’s situation is a consequence of:
− introduction of the normative construct “the well-being of the child” as 
well as other similar constructs such as “the well-being of the student”, “the 
well-being of children in a family”, or “the well-being of the minor” in the 
wording of legislative provisions,
− introduction of the normative construct “the best interest of the child” in the 
wording of legislative provisions,
− judicial application of the provisions of international law which refer to 
constructs such as “the well-being of the child”, “the best interest of the 
child”, “the welfare of the child”, as well as other related constructs,
− inclusion in the wording of legislative provisions of constructs similar to 
“the well-being of the child” whose semantic scope includes references to 
the value of the child’s well-being.
Judicial discretionary powers are largely dependent on legislative intentions 
and the diversity of general reference clauses introduced in a normative text. In-
terpretation may be based solely on the criterion of well-being11 or account for two 
or more extra-legal criteria12, e.g. the well-being of the child and public interest. 
In the latter case, the understanding of the expression will depend on the mutual 
correlations that may exist between the two criteria. For instance, the obligation 
to inoculate children is consistent both with the well-being of the child and social 
interest. In this case, the Supreme Administrative Court evoked the wording of the 
law specifying the conditions of exercising parental authority13. It should be noted 
that the character of judicial freedom in the context of the child’s well-being may 
influence the ability to refer to other extra-legal criteria, and vice versa. In fact, the 
criterion of the well-being of the child has a bearing on the determination of legal 
consequences in the course of the judicial process.
10 L. Leszczyński, Tworzenie generalnych klauzul odsyłających, Lublin 2000, p. 18.
11 See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 June 2017, II OSK 2366/16, 
Legalis 1649542.
12 See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 12 July 2017, II GSK 3611/15, 
Legalis 1672604.
13 See L. Leszczyński, Tworzenie generalnych klauzul…, p. 18.
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CRITERION OF THE WELL-BEING OF THE CHILD AS AN ELEMENT OF 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Legal principles play a particular role in the process of applying the law, primar-
ily in terms of directing the focus of interpretation based on the axiological, func-
tional and hierarchical significance of given principles relative to other standards14.
At the level of normative acts, one could identify standards – principles such as 
the principle of protecting the child’s well-being (Family and Guardianship Code15 
and Article 3.2 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child16), the principle of 
protecting the rights of the child (Article 72.1 of the Polish Constitution17), or the 
principle of securing the best interest of the child (Article 3.1 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child18). Within the legal system, said principles correlate with 
each other to provide a cohesive protective instrument.
The gravity of the interpretative difficulty inherent in the application of legal 
principle is clearly visible in the context of the extensive output in the fields of 
legal dogmatics and case law.
It is noteworthy that when adjudicating in cases involving children, courts are 
increasingly inclined to evoke legal principles, thus incorporating the consideration 
of the well-being of the child into the judicial process itself. This is also the case 
when the discussed criterion is not an element per se of the given legal provision. 
Hence, the well-being of the child treated as a legal principle has a considerable 
bearing on the entire judicial process, from validation of the legal sources to the 
substantiation of the decision to apply the given law. A similar situation is ob-
served in terms of the principle of protecting the rights of the child or securing 
the best interest of the child. In the course of the interpretation, one needs to only 
identify the law from which a given legal principle originates. A good example 
illustrating the potency of the discussed criterion is the judgement of the Supreme 
14 Cf. L. Leszczyński, G. Maroń, Pojęcie i treść zasad prawa oraz generalnych klauzul odsyła-
jących. Uwagi porównawcze, „Annales UMCS sectio G (Ius)” 2013, Vol. 60(1), p. 81.
15 Act of 25 February 1964 – Family and Guardianship Code (Journal of Laws 2019, item 2086).
16 Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 October 1989 (Journal of Laws 1991, No. 120, 
item 526). Courts commonly evoke Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, 
the interpretations tend to derive from the wording of the provision only one principle pertaining 
to securing the best interest of the child, regardless of the fact that the article conveys two distinct 
principles, the other one being that of protecting the well-being of the child.
17 Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Journal of Laws 1997, No. 78, item 483).
18 Article 3.1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child reads: “In all actions concerning chil-
dren, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”. The cited 
provision emphasizes the obligation to account for the best interest of the child when applying the law, 
the wording of the Polish version of the Convention is notably somewhat different. Nonetheless, case 
law does not seem to evidence a negative impact of this fact on the judicial interpretation of the same.





Administrative Court of 30 October 201819. The facts of the case pertained to the 
legal status of a child raised by single-sex parents, born from a surrogate mother, 
whose citizenship rights were acquired by law. The competent Voivode refused 
to issue the decision awarding Polish citizenship to the child and demanded prior 
submission of information regarding the child’s parents. The decision was subse-
quently upheld by the minister who evoked the following arguments. Firstly, he 
emphasized the legal nature of the concept of parenthood under Polish law which 
does not recognize the institutions of “single-sex parents” or “a surrogate mother”, 
stating furthermore that surrogacy contracts are not valid in the light thereof. More-
over, it was argued that single-sex couples have no parental rights under the laws 
of Poland. In the opinion of the authority, the birth certificate issued in California 
failed to specify the actual parents of the child and, therefore, did not comply with 
relevant Polish legislation. The arguments of said authorities were recognized by 
the Voivodeship Administrative Court which categorically evoked the public order 
clause expressed in the text of the Act of 4 February 2011 – International Private 
Law. In the Court’s opinion, the rule of Polish law stipulates that a child can only 
have two parents (mother – a woman, and father – a man, with the emphasis being 
on bonds formed biologically or through adoption), as well as that a child cannot 
constitute the object of a contract that deprives such person of the identity derived 
from natural parenthood. The subsequent ruling of the Supreme Administrative 
Court adopted a contrary approach. The Court observed that the issue of primary 
importance in the relevant case is the fact that “a human being is born with inherent 
and inalienable dignity, and the right to citizenship if one of the parents is a Polish 
national”. At the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court evoked the crite-
rion of the well-being of the child by citing Article 3.1 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The relevant provision refers to the “best interest of the child”, 
nonetheless, one can observe a tendency in case law to refer to the well-being of 
the child specifically in the context of the legal principle expressed in Article 3.1 
of the Convention. This further confirms the fact that the axiological framework 
of the regulation is based on the discussed criterion.
The example of the aforementioned ruling reveals judicial freedom orientated 
towards establishing the well-being of the child with respect to the rights of the 
child and, thus, employing a case approach that considers future legal consequences. 
Accounting for the criterion of the well-being of the child as the basis of the ap-
plicable legal principles in the judicial decision-making process is necessary if the 
relevant legal interpretation is to be correctly performed.
19 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 October 2018, II OSK 1868/16, Legalis 
1860297.




Interpretative Discretion of Judiciary and the Well-Being of the Child 193
FOCUS OF DISCRETIONARY POWER
Judicial discretion is naturally related to the notions of judicial freedom, judi-
cial activism, and judicial independence. In my considered opinion, approaching 
discretionary powers in the context of the same leads to a rather broad under-
standing and overall scope thereof. This stems from a variety of reasons and may 
be conditioned by more than just “discernibility” of the well-being of the child in 
legal provisions. Discretion with respect to the application of laws pertaining to 
children is, in a way, a given due to the very nature of cases related thereto. One 
could conclude that when a case involving a child is adjudicated, particular care 
must be taken to weight the interests of all participants in the proceedings with due 
consideration for the discussed criterion.
Judicial discretion is related to the principle of judicial freedom, not to be 
confused with arbitrariness. Given the above, such discretionary powers should 
also be considered in terms of informed and experience-based interpretation of 
law through the application, or more specifically reconstruction, of the relevant 
normative grounds, taking into account legal norms and normative constructs re-
ferring the decision-maker to extra-legal criteria, as well as the actual purpose and 
intention of the law itself. For instance, observing the existence in a given provision 
of a reference clause without relating the same to the relevant legal principle may 
lead to erroneous conclusions and consequently less than accurate interpretation. 
It is, therefore, not enough to merely “reach” outside the legal system for certain 
values and interpret legal provisions on this basis, one must also verify one’s infer-
ence against constitutional and conventional norms-principles as well as, at times, 
consider the actual purpose of the given regulation. A good example here could be 
the judgement of the Supreme Court of 31 January 201820. The ruling pertains to 
a decision of a Danish court regarding cancellation of joint parental authority and 
transfer of the entirety thereof to the minor child’s father. The first instance court 
recognized the foreign judgement concluding that the ruling was not contrary to 
the child’s well-being. However, the Appellate Court deemed this judgement to be 
inconsistent with the Polish public policy. The Supreme Court elaborated on the 
argumentation provided by the Appellate Court by stating that “primary public pol-
icy principles ought to be understood as fundamental constitutional determinations 
pertinent to the socioeconomic system and key provisions regulating the respective 
domains of substantive and procedural law that cannot be automatically equated 
with the substantive grounds for the application of a civil legal institution”. The 
Court concluded that the well-being of the child constitutes such a principle and 
20 Judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 31 January 2018, IV CSK 442/17, Legalis 
1765977.





dictates, in the case at hand, that the foreign ruling should not be recognized due 
to the dominant role of the mother in childrearing.
In terms of limits to judicial discretion, we should consider the prevalent opinion 
that one ought to account for the actual purpose of the given act, evoke generally 
applicable values and laws, operate within a particular ideology of judicial practice 
defined and adopted by the given judicial authority, as well as apply relevant legal 
principles (including the principles of a democratic state rooted in the rule of law, 
the postulate of judicial independence, and legal certainty)21. Notably, the afore 
ought to be considered primarily in terms of focusing judicial discretion rather 
than limiting the same, which follows from the already considered differentiation 
between judicial freedom and arbitrariness. Moreover, the criterion of the well-be-
ing of the child sometimes detracts from the formalism22 associated with ongoing 
court proceedings, which further corroborates the thesis that the same cannot be 
considered a limitation to discretionary powers.
Judicial freedom is affected by the nature of the expression “well-being of the 
child” which can indeed be interpreted in a variety of ways relative to its contextual 
character stemming from the consideration of, e.g., other principles, general clauses, 
framework standards, and specificity of the given branch of law.
The very existence of the criterion of the child’s well-being, as manifested 
in a variety of normative constructs: a) determines the direction of operative in-
terpretations; b) prevents arbitrariness but facilitates freedom of interpretation23; 
c) should not be treated as a limitation by law but rather as guidance for judicial 
objectivism (which means that judicial discretion is not absolute but rather focused 
on the criterion of the child’s well-being in all cases involving children); d) ought 
to lead to continuous verification of previous case law and claims made by repre-
sentatives of legal dogmatics.
When evoking substantiation of court decisions, entities partaking in proceed-
ings rarely refer to the standards-principles conveyed in conventions (e.g. Article 3 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child) or constitutional standards-principles 
(e.g. Article 72 of the Polish Constitution). When they do, however, the arguments 
voiced are not always consistent with the correct understanding of the well-being 
of children, i.e. focused on the facilitation of their development and protection 
of their rights. At times, situations emerge where courts fail to properly exercise 
their discretionary powers. Specifically, rather than duly account for the content of 
21 B. Wojciechowski (op. cit., p. 199) argues that the purpose of an act limits judicial discretion 
due to the fact that the role of the court is to facilitate the realisation of its inherent goal.
22 See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 24 November 2016, III CZP 
68/16, Legalis 1533167; judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 24 November 2016, 
II CA 1/16, Legalis 1565006.
23 A similar sentiment was voiced by B. Wojciechowski (op. cit., p. 197 ff.) who concluded that 
when exercising one’s discretionary powers, a judge must not make random, arbitrary choices.
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standards-principles and infer values from systemic rules, authorities adopt arbitrary 
interpretations of what the well-being of the child actually entails. It should be 
stressed that legal principles do not limit the extent of judicial discretion but rather 
direct its focus. And it is that very focus that ensures the already mentioned judicial 
freedom24. It would be prudent at this point to also evoke the opinion expressed by 
A. Strzembosz, who considers any judicial decision contrary to the well-being of 
the child to be erroneous25. Hence, a correct interpretation of the provisions of law 
that duly accounts for the well-being of the child (in the case of the afore evalu-
ation – the well-being of the minor) promotes desirable attitudes and respect for 
the law, thus constituting the expression of correctly exercised judicial discretion.
In the context of the well-being of the child, judicial discretionary powers are 
therefore manifested in the ability to duly correlate extra-legal and normative domains. 
The line (axiological boundary) separating the two domains, i.e. legal axiology and 
open axiology, is becoming increasingly blurred26. Correlations between open axiol-
ogy and inner systemic axiology stem from the coexistence of standards and clauses 
pertaining to the same criteria, as well as the creation of legal provisions containing 
references. The links between the open and inner systemic are rooted not only in the 
mere coexistence of rules and clauses sharing the same given criterion, but also stem 
from the entanglement of the axiological well-being of the child in the category of 
the rights of the child. The criterion itself pertains to the open axiology due to its 
reference to non-legal values. The strong impact on interpretative activities results 
from the fact that the well-being of the child is an element of the rule of law, as well 
as acts of international law and statutory provisions.
ATTEMPT AT OPTIMISATION
Interpretative discretion of judiciary in the context of the well-being of the child 
entails judicial freedom of a given case with due consideration for the directions 
stemming from the very character of the discussed term. In matters pertaining to 
24 See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 31 January 2018, IV CSK 
442/17, Legalis 1765977; judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 24 November 2016, 
II CA 1/16, Legalis 1565006; judgement of the Supreme Court – Criminal Division of 29 July 
2016, V KK 2/16, Legalis 1508201; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 30 Jan-
uary 2018, I OSK 611/16, Legalis 1740445; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 
12 July 2017, II GSK 3611/15, Legalis 1672604; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court 
of 30 October 2018, II OSK 1868/16, Legalis 1860297; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court 
of 15 October 2010, I OSK 1024/10, Legalis 328643.
25 A. Strzembosz, Nowa ustawa o postępowaniu w sprawach nieletnich. Próba komentarza, 
Warszawa 1983, p. 50.
26 L. Leszczyński, Kategoria słuszności w wykładni prawa, „Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2011, 
Vol. 15, p. 52.





children, the judge adjudicates with the view to shaping the current and postulated 
situation of the minor/underage person to facilitate their proper development in 
every aspect thereof, including with respect to their dignity and personal rights. 
Undoubtedly, due to their age, lack of life experience and knowledge, as well as 
inability to make informed life decisions, children find themselves at a consider-
able disadvantage vis-à-vis adult persons and should, therefore, be provided with 
special protection.
Delimiting the exact scope of judicial discretion is daunting, in my opinion 
even unfeasible task. It seems that a far more adequate approach would be to em-
ploy wording such as narrow or broad perspective when referring to the same. As 
follows from the afore deliberations, in the context of the well-being of the child, 
a broad understanding of discretionary powers must be assumed. It is, therefore, 
vital that an individual approach be adopted to allow verification of the validity 
of prior determinations. When adjudicating a case in the context of given facts, 
somewhat different principles apply to correlating the operative interpretation with 
the general reference clause evoking “the well-being of the child” as compared to 
the context of legal principles, particularly the principle of protecting the rights of 
the child, or evoking specific provisions regulating the rights of minors.
One should bear in mind that judicial discretion will pertain to the entire scope 
of proceedings in the given case, not only to the judgement made. The court is 
obliged to account for the well-being of the child in the course of courtroom pro-
ceedings, e.g. by taking evidence from expert opinions or social enquiry reports. 
Therefore, the interpretation and determination of the child’s current and postulated 
situation constitutes a problem related not only to direct interpretation of law but 
also a number of other distinct factors, e.g. psychological, social, or educational – 
which necessitates adequate adjustment of one’s approach.
It should be once again emphasized that application of the criterion of the child’s 
well-being must not be perceived in terms of limiting discretionary powers. The 
child’s situation ought to be shaped in such a way so as to eliminate any potential, 
abstract threats that may emerge in the near future and jeopardise the minor’s 
well-being. At times, strict adherence to the letter of the law proves insufficient 
as the rights of the child must also be taken into account27. The child must not be 
forced to bear the negative consequences of overly casuistic or imperfectly worded 
regulations. Hence, judicial discretion ought to be considered in terms of categories 
such as experience and maturity, as well as values such as objectivism, impartiality, 
and guardianship over the rule of law, which further emphasizes the key role of the 
judge in determining and shaping the situation of the child.
27 See, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Court – Civil Division of 24 November 2016, II CA 1/16, 
Legalis 1565006.
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STRESZCZENIE
Dobro dziecka jest często spotykanym i wspólnym dla wielu gałęzi prawa kryterium. Jest na-
rzędziem zarówno dla prawodawcy, jak i dla podmiotu stosującego prawo, używanym po to, aby 
ukierunkować podmioty stosujące prawo na obowiązek zapewnienia pełnej ochrony dziecku. W opra-
cowaniu skoncentrowano się na analizie zagadnienia interpretacyjnej dyskrecjonalności sędziowskiej 
rozpatrywanej w optyce dobra dziecka na przykładzie orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższego, Naczelnego 
Sadu Administracyjnego i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. W pracy została podjęta analiza, jak przeja-
wia się interpretacyjna dyskrecjonalność sędziowska w sprawach, w których głównym wątkiem jest 
ustalenie aktualnej i postulowanej sytuacji dziecka tak, aby końcowe rozstrzygnięcie było dla niego 
jak najbardziej korzystne.
Keywords: interpretacyjna dyskrecjonalność sędziowska; dobro dziecka; aksjologia pozaprawna
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